This paper analyzes attempts to remake Thailand’s electoral and party landscape over the last two decades, with particular attention to reforms in the wake of the 2014 military coup. Focusing primarily on electoral system reform, the paper begins by documenting the multiple efforts to re-engineer Thailand’s parties and elections since 1997. This includes the repeated attempts of military-backed reformers—since the 2006 coup—to fragment Thailand’s party system, weaken political parties, and reduce support for the political parties associated with former Prime Minister Thakin Shinawatra and his “red-shirt” allies (first the Thai Rak Thai Party and more recently the Pheu Thai Party). The core of the paper focuses on how the post-2014 regime of Prayuth Chan-ocha sought to undercut support for the parties and social forces that it considered to be a threat. Using data from recent elections, including that of March 2019, the paper examines the extent to which these reforms achieved their goals, and why and how they often produced unintended consequences. It concludes that the military has been notably unsuccessful in achieving its goals.