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Oral Presentation (20 minutes)

Systems Engineering & Design

SED Contributed 4 - Systems engineering in national security

584165 - Application of Acquisition Theory

Monday, May 20, 2019

5:40 PM – 6:00 PM

Location: St Johns 33

Primary Contact(s)

Elizabeth Payne

Undergraduate Research Assistant
University of Alabama in Huntsville

Disclosure: Disclosure information not submitted.

Paper
Elizabeth Payne

Undergraduate Research Assistant
University of Alabama in Huntsville

Disclosure: Disclosure information not submitted.

Paper

Co-Author(s)

Elizabeth Payne

Undergraduate Research Assistant
University of Alabama in Huntsville

Disclosure: Disclosure information not submitted.

Paper
Elizabeth Payne

Undergraduate Research Assistant
University of Alabama in Huntsville

Disclosure: Disclosure information not submitted.

Paper

Presenter(s)

EC

Erin Corum

Undergraduate Research Assistant
University of Alabama in Huntsville

Disclosure: Disclosure information not submitted.
EC

Erin Corum

Undergraduate Research Assistant
University of Alabama in Huntsville

Disclosure: Disclosure information not submitted.

Co-Author(s)

EC

Erin Corum

Undergraduate Research Assistant
University of Alabama in Huntsville

Disclosure: Disclosure information not submitted.
EC

Erin Corum

Undergraduate Research Assistant
University of Alabama in Huntsville

Disclosure: Disclosure information not submitted.
PC

Paul Collopy, Ph.D.

Professor
University of Alabama in Huntsville

Disclosure: Disclosure information not submitted.
PC

Paul Collopy, Ph.D.

Professor
University of Alabama in Huntsville

Disclosure: Disclosure information not submitted.

Learning Objectives:

This paper reports on a research project that aims to cut the cost of government-led aerospace system development projects while accelerating schedules and improving performance. The incentives produced by standard requirements-based contracting lead to suboptimal outcomes from the perspective of the government. We create a contract that incentivizes optimization rather than using requirements. The incentives align cost savings, rapid development, and higher quality with contractor profit. The contractor is paid more for a product with higher performance, and even more for a product that is delivered sooner. Therefore, the contractor can balance cost, performance and time in the way that the government would prefer. Superior program outcomes arise naturally from the incentives in the contract.