The size of the redistributive budget depends on the type of welfare institutions in place. Institutional structures play a significant role in determining how redistributive processes are shaped and who benefits from the social insurance programs. The Robin Hood strategy of low-income targeting, that has been a characteristic of many welfare states in the past, envisions an egalitarian welfare system, in which a large proportion of the redistribution budget goes to the poor. But the paradox of low-income targeting is that it excludes the middle and upper classes from the full benefits of social insurance programs, leading to a rise in private insurance and a fall in economic growth. Acemoglu and Robinson find the solution to this problem by proposing the development of inclusive democratic institutions. These institutions derive political legitimacy from high levels of public participation in the decision-making processes, because of which social policies introduced under an inclusive institutional framework aim to achieve growth with equality. The question of whether pro-poor social insurance redistributive policies can sustain both economic growth and equality in the long-run or whether it is eventually a zero-sum game needs further research under the context of Asian welfare systems. Therefore, this paper will hypothesize that inclusive democratic institutions lead to higher levels of welfare redistribution in South Asia, while also questioning whether pro-poor social insurance policies are the best strategy to reach this end.